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The Evolution of Penology in Pennsylvania. By Harry Elmer Barnes.
Indianapolis, Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1927. pp. 414.
Professor Barnes, in this admirable book, gives an extremely detailed
account of the history of penology in Pennsylvania from pre-Penn days
to 1927. The method is informative rather than critical. Only occasion-
ally does the author rise in righteous wrath at some particularly shocking
or dense phenomenon. Thus he repeatedly refers to the act of 1897
which practically destroyed prison labor, as the "abominable" or "notorious"
Muehlbronner Act, and to the veto of an act passed in 1917 re-establishing
indeterminate sentences as "singularly opaque." But aside from these and
a few other critical excursions, which incidentally are always acuto, the
book maintains an even tone of information. And this to the reviewer
is as it should be.
Pennsylvania is almost unique in the breadth of its penological experi-
ences. Prior to the enlightened Quaker Code of 1681 all the traditional
repressive penal barbarisms of England bloomed with vigor in Pennsyl-
vania-many capital offenses, severe corporal punishment, and the pro-
miscuous dumping of hardened criminals, the insane, young, old, male,
female, suspects, debtors, etc. in horrible jails. In 1682 the enlightened
Quaker Code was enacted, which, "excepting only the closely related
colony of West Jersey . . . unquestionably marked the first instance
in the history of crimiinal jurisprudence in which imprisonment at hard
labor was prescribed as a punishment for a majority of the acts which
were branded as crimes by the community." But this era of light lasted
only until 1718. In that year the Quakers reverted to the severe English
code, thus practically destroying the reforms that they had created, in order
to retain the right of affirmation. From that time to 1786 Pennsylvania
experienced its black penological age. In 1786 "hard labor, publicly and dis-
gracefully imposed" was substituted for the death penalty. In 1787 the
Philadelphia Society for Alleviating the Miseries of Public Prisons was or-
ganized and unto this day has been the greatest experimental force in Penn-
sylvania. Its long record of achievements is continuously stressed by the
author and properly so. In 1788 the Society aft& investigation, recom-
mended (1) more private labor, (2) separation of hardened criminals from
first offenders, (3) separation of sexes, (4) prohibition of liquors. The legis-
lature asked for futher details and the Society's reply is the first recorded
recommendation of solitary confinei'ent at hard labor. In 1789 the major
recommendations were adopted by the legislature and in 1790 an act was
passed which marks the legal origin of the Pennsylvania system. Inter alia,
it ordered the erection of cells for the solitary confinement of the norp
hardened offenders. In 1794, the Society, after accomplishing many in-
termediate reforms, succeeded in having the legislature abolish capital
punishment for all crimes except murder in the first degree.
Conditions in the Walnut Street Jail were frightful. It is recorded
that in 1795 thirty to forty men were housed at night in a room 18 feet
square. In 1801 the society strongly recommended the erection of a new
prison, and in 1803 the legislature appropriated money for the Arch
Street prison which was finally built in 1817, and then used only for
debtors. Its life was short for it was found to be unsafe. Fraud was
charged in its construction. The Society continued its agitations and in
1818, $60,000 was appropriated for the Western Penitentiary at Allegheny,
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and in 1821, $100,000 for the Eastern Penitentiary at Philadelphia. In
1828 through the efforts of the Society, the Philadelphia House of Re-
fuge for juveniles was built. The Western and Eastern penitentiaries
were built respectively in 1826 and 1835.
The Western Penitentiary was built along lines to carry into effect
the principle of solitary confinement but not at hard labor. Consequently
the individual cells were small and very dark. Soon after its com-
pletion it became evident that the principle of solitary confinement alone,
even without labor, could not be executed since it was necessary to ex-
ercise the prisoners in groups. In 1829 the famous act was passed direct-
ing that the prisons be conducted on the principle of solitary confinement
at hard labor. This necessitated practically an entire reconstruction of
the gloomy and fortress-like Western Penitentiary so as to provide ade-
quate working facilities in the single cells. Like Lao Tze, the prison
authorities had an abiding faith in the remedial powers of leisurely reflec-
tion.
In regard to prison labor, the author says of the Walnut Street jail
that "it was not less of an industrial failure than an administrative
fiasco." There was practically no prison labor in the Western Penitentiary
until its reconstruction. An industrial system was promptly established in
the Eastern Penitentiary. The inspectors were exuberant. Contemporary
investigations showed flagrant abuses.
The remainder of the book is devoted to developments from 1835 to
1927. The discussion centers around the disintegration of the Pennsyl-
vania system and progress along lines of commutation, progressive clas-
sification, indeterminate sentence and parole, and segregation.
The inspectors of the Eastern Penitentiary were oblivious of the Indus-
trial Revolution. Until the sixties, labor was conducted on the solitary
confinement principle, and so, of necessity machinery could not be used
in any appreciable way. After the sixties, congestion made solitary con-
finement impossible. Still the inspectors steadfastly and fanatically
preached the virtues of the Pennsylvania system though it had ceased
to exist except in their own imaginations. The abolition of contract con-
vict labor in 1883 and the requirement that goods be stamped "convict
made" had no great effect on conditions in the Eastern Penitentiary.
History of convict labor in the Western Penitentiary is quite different.
The inspectors there regarded solitary confinement as a necessary evil.
In 1860 the industrial revolution dawned on them and soon they began
to demand congregate workshops. In 1869 an act was passed allowing
congregation for work and in 1873 a shop was installed. By 1880 the
industrial revolution was complete in the Western Penitentiary. Until
1869 the public account system was used, and after that, the contract
system. Its abolition in 1883 was therefore a much greater blow to the
Western Penitentiary than to the Eastern.
In 1897 the above-mentioned "abominable and notorious" Bluehlbronner
Act was passed. Prison labor in Pennsylvania became a farce until about
1915. In 'that year an act was passed providing that prison labor be
conducted on the state-use system. Improvement in conditions was slow
since there was no provision directing that other state institutions buy
only from the prisons. In 1918 only 30 out of 720 convicts at Riverside
were employed under the state-use system. This defect was indirectly
remedied by the creation in 1921 of the centralized Department of Public
Welfare.
Professor Barnes traces also the architectual changes since 1835. The
Eastern Penitentiary has been continually added to, seemingly only after
additions became absolutely imperative. It finally became apparent that,
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because of the growth of the ,city around the penitentiary, the site would
sooner or later have to be abandoned. In 1925, $750,000 was appropriated
for the eiection of the new Eastern Penitentiary at Gratesford in Mont-
gomery County.
Architectural developments in the west have been more dramatic. In
1873 an act was passed providing that a commission report to the legis-
lature a suitable site for a new prison. This was necessitated by the
congestion in the Western Penitentiary. Then comes what to the reviewer
is the most disgusting chapter in the history of penology in Pennsylvania.
It was decided to locate the plant on the site of the old Western House of
Refuge on the Ohio River in the City of Allegheny. The site has been
abandoned by the House of Refuge because it had been found to be damp,
foggy and generally unhealthy. Although the inspectors well knew this,
it was due to their vigorous efforts that the site was selected. The plant
cost $2,000,000. It has been decided ultimately to abandon the site. Just
what "ultimately" means is not apparent. "There have been few instances,
where the interests of a commonwealth and the welfare of a considerable
group of mankind have been more unfortunately sacrificed to personal con-
venience and immediate opportunism . . ." Warden Francis in 1909
strenuously pressed for a new site and finally secured the passage of an
act directing the selection of a rural site. The Rockview plant was the
result. It "is a magnificent example of the discredited type of conventional
penal cage designed safely to jail convicts rather than to promote their
reformation. . . . The Rockview Penitentiary is veritably a penological
'white elephant'."
The reviewer has attempted to sketch briefly only those parts of the
book devoted to developments in the Eastern and Western Penitentiaries.
Professor Barnes also discusses the development of the Criminal Code,
advances along the lines of probation, parole, segregation, classification,
etc. The book is a beautifully constructed storehouse of penological in-
formation. It cannot be overlooked by anyone interested in the subject.
Since a reviewer must criticize, this one would suggest that the book is
a trifle repetitious and that a more detailed account of developments in
the other institutions of Pennsylvania would have been desirable.
Throughout the book, the author's penal philosophy is apparent. He is
not a panaceist even of the mildest type. He regards no reform as a
cure. Reform is experiment, trial and error. In chemistry, if one combines
a certain amount of hydrogen with a certain amount of oxygen he gets
water. In the treatment of what is really an abstraction called "tho
criminal" the specific ascertainment of the effect of certain "reforms" or
"advances" is impossible. We must know more about what makes people
behave queerly. Until we do know more, however, we should not resort to
the treadmill.
L. A. TULIN.
The Insurance Commissioner in the United States. By Edwin Wilhite
Patterson, With a Foreword by Felix Frankfurter. Cambridge, Harv-
ard University Press, 1927. pp. xviii, 589.
Professor Patterson's new book The Insurance Commissioner in the
United States is, as the author states, a study in the administrative law
and practice of insurance. As the first of a new series of Harvard studies
in administrative law it sets a high standard. It is thorough-going, re-
plete with organized accurate information valuable not only to public offi-
cials charged with the administration of the insurance business but also to
attorneys, insurance officials and students of law and political science. The
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author has a grasp of the legal phases of this subject and no small insight
into many of the practical phases of the insurance business.
Unlike many modern legal text books it is rich in boti citations and
cogitation. It is constructively critical of the present system of insurance
laws and especially of their method of administration. There is much
merit in the criticisms.
The first chapter is in fact a summary of what follows. The author
says:
"I hope that this summary will indicate what is on the menu and at
the same time provide cafeteria service for those who have not the time
or digestion for the larger meal."
The author sells by sample and it is the reviewer's guess that one who
reads the first chapter will read the entire volume with great interest. We
read it all twice.
The author discusses the position of the insurance commissioner in the
field of administrative law. That officer, at his best, is one versed in the
principles and practices of insurance and is charged with supervision of
the creation, licensing, operation and liquidation of insurance companies
including control of insurance rates, forms of insurance contracts, licensing
of agents and various other incidents. He is tax collector, examiner of
insurance financial statements, investigator, inquisitor and judge, all in
one.
Both in theory and in practice the insurance commissioner applies the
fundamental principles of regulation laid down by the legislature to the
specific facts and situations as they arise and decides whether the thing
or act done or neglected to be done accords with or violates the statutory
provision applicable. In theory there may be no delegation of legislative
power to the insurance commissioner. The author very logically points out
that in practice, legislative authority has in no small measure been dele-
gated to the insurance commissioner and that the courts on one or another
species of reasoning find ways of sustaining the action of the commissioner
especially with reference to his findings of fact. The insurance world
knows this to be true. The legislature is partly responsible for the exer-
cise of legislative powers by the administrative. This is because the laws
laying down norms or rules of action for the guidance of the insurance
commissioner are very vague and indefinite. In some states this officer is
charged with maintaining "reasonable rates" for insurance but the legis-
lature does not define what is meant by this term. Companies may not be
licensed in various states unless in "sound financial condition." Companies
and agents are forbidden "to misrepresent the terms of any insurance
policy." It is obvious in such cases and many more cited by the author
that the insurance commissioner is confronted with a large responsibility
and little or no legislative assistance in applying the rule of action. Nor
have judicial decisions been frequent enough to aid materially in constru-
ing such vague terms. Insurance companies and the public do not rezort
to the courts except in extreme cases. It is perhaps a credit to both the
insurance commissioners and the insurance fraternity that such is the case.
It shows a disposition and ability to co-operate in settling technical
questions of fact and policy. This record indicates rather clearly that
the present policy of supervision is well conceived in principle; that there
is big room for improvement is not open to doubt. Professor Patterson
refers to the administrative tribunals of Europe which have reduced ad-
ministration to a much better organized and definite system than we yet
have in this country. As time goes on the administration of insurance will
no doubt more closely approach the continental system in these respects.
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Your reviewer believes that administrative law and practice in dealing with
public utilities is considerably more orderly than in the case of insurance.
The author minutely classifies and describes the various subjects over
which the insurance commissioner has control. He tells in detail of those
duties such as audit of financial statements of insurance companies and
examination into conditions of such companies by his deputies and assis-
tants.
He considers fully the administrative procedure and the method of ad-
ministrative determinations of the insurance commissioner. He points out
that in most states the procedure is very informal and mainly lacking as
to any well organized method of framing issues. The statutes are mainly
silent as to a hearing by the official before action is taken by him. Very
meager provision is made for the preparation and filing of clear cut deci-
sions or rulings even after a hearing is held. In general, no machinery or
method is provided for a review of the official acts of the insurance com-
missioner by any other superior administrative official. Where court re-
view is possible the method of procedure is too often vague and uncertain.
One cannot but fail to be impressed with the weaknesses of our present
system in these respects.
It is inevitable that much discretion must be left to the insurance com-
missioner. Because of rapidly changing conditions, it is not practicable
for the legislature to define in ultimate detail rules of action to guide the
administrative official. Matters would be much improved if the
administrative procedure were more definite and certain with a clear right
of review in nearly all cases, especially where construction of a statute is
involved. Review of technical questions having to do primarily with facts
might better be reviewed by a semi-judicial court of review made up of
judges skilled in the technique of insurance.
The latter part of the book deals with the control of the insurance com-
missioner by the executive, legislative and judicial departments of govern-
ment. It also considers the indefinite control exercised over this official by
the force of public opinion even when the official is not elective. The author
also points out practical control by co-operation between the insurance com-
missioner and professional or semi-professional organizations, possessing
technical knowledge and engaged in the insurance business, such as the
National Board of Fire Underwriters and the National Fraternal Congress
and also discusses the constructive activities of the National Convention of
Insurance Commissioners resulting in considerable uniform legislation and
the solution of technical problems common to the various states.
The chief methods of judicial review are by mandamus and injunction.
One cannot be but impressed with the confusion of the law as to what acts
of the insurance commissioner are subject to review. Discretionary powers
are theoretically not subject to review. There is a strong disposition on the
part of the courts not to disturb findings of fact but the courts readily
take jurisdiction where the construction or interpretation of a statute is
involved.
The volume contains valuable appendices which are very interesting.
One of these contains a very illuminating and concise history of the growth
and development of administrative supervision of insurance. There is a
complete table of cases, bibliography and topical index.
Professor Patterson has done a thorough job of it. His book is the best
on the subject and will not be easily equalled. It is a distinct contribution
to legal literature on the subject of insurance. The reviewer hopes that in
the reprint of this book the index will be amplified by the use of "catch
words." This would greatly facilitate its use for ready reference by those
of us who must find our law quickly. ERWIN A. Mm ns.
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Cases on the Law of Persons anzd Domcstic Rclations. By William Edward
McCurdy. Chicago, Callaghan and Company, 1927. pp. xi, 1246.
Some six years ago, Francis B. Sayre's Cases on Labor Law was pointed
out as evidence of the trend of legal instruction away from the historical
categories. That was an initial signpost of a tendency to consider law
from the angle of its applications rather than of its sources--of its applica-
tion to existing social conditions. And now we find in Professor McCurdy's
Cases on the Law of Persons and Domestic Relations a further sign on
this highroad toward socialization.
Mr. McCurdy is not open to attack on the grounds of any real radicalism
in the legal curriculum. He cuts no new diagonal shaft through the strata
of law school courses in the direction of "functionalism." The book con-
cerns Persons and Domestic Relations-not Family Law. It includes the
subjects of marriage, separation and divorce; the subjects of husband and
-wife and married women; of parent and child, guardian and ward and
infancy. Few of the corners which fit historically into other subjects have
been clipped to assemble the jig-saw picture which social forces have been
making of the family's legal relations. The one marked exception to this
is the culling from the subject of Conflict of Laws a chapter on Interna-
tional Jurisdiction over the marriage contract and status. An infant's con-
tracts and the torts of a child have been considered before this to be an
appendage to this branch of the law. But no mention do we find of here-
tical inclusions: criminal law as it relates to desertion or non-support, to
offenses by and against children; no direct mention of decedent's estates
or of trusts for the provision of the family. In a tactful way Mr. McCurdy
does include cases on legislative divorce. Within this long-latent seed
lies the potential fruit of a scientific approach to marital diffulties that
is, a system of administrative divorce.
To suggest as adverse criticisms Mr. McCurdy's omissions is to disregard
his purpose. The casebook was prepared for teaching in the Harvard
Law School, and in consequence must harmonize with the curriculum. If
he has cut no really new shafts, he has distinctly broadened the old. The
emphasis in the subject is completely shifted, and shifted not because of
historical but because of social conditions. There is a most fortunate com-
bination of the usually distinct subjects of Parent and Child, Guardian and
Ward and Infancy. And between one-third and one-half of the volume
concerns Marriage, Separation and Divorce. This departure is the more
startling because the formation and dissolution of the marriage contract
are regulated largely by statute. But statutory content can never be all-in-
clusive; statutes are al ays to be interpreted in the light of pre-existing law.
If the legislators had known more of this background before attempting
to change it by statute and if the common-law judges and chancellors
had been somewhat less ignorant of the ecclesiastical-law basis of our
matrimonial institutions, the legal status of the family might not be in its
present state of confusion. And, unfortunately, there is still the tendency
to change the situation by haphazard legislation rather than by a careful
research into the foundations of these institutions.
In demonstrating that the subjects of domestic relations are basically
matters of decisional law, Mr. McCurdy may have gone a step too far. It
would occasionally be of help to the student to find stated in a footnote
the statute which the court is interpreting. The footnote citations of earcs
are more inclusive than informative; the casual student may glean from
a compilor's brief analysis of groups of cases a breadth of understanding
which, if left to his own resources, he will never acquire. But that is a
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question of teaching method. To review a casebook without knowledge
of the direction of classroom discussion and supplementation is akin to
describing a human being from a view of his skeleton.
In this instance the skeleton is admirably constructed. The cases do
illustrate the material within the outline of the work. As illustrations of
his pointt Mr. McCurdy has chosen, where possible, cases which are factu-
ally as well as legally interesting. That the cases are long is caused by
the nature of the subject: the more closely is a case related to human
factors, the more carefully balanced must be the social evidence and the
more inclusive the picture of the entire situation. Most important of the
book's virtues is its absence of partnership. Casebooks as well as texts
can be so constructed as to attempt the proof of the editor's theories. In
the field of the domestic relations theories are as diverse as the emotions.
In leaving sociological theories entirely to classroom discussion, Mr. Mc-
Curdy has made his book the more universally of service.
In the practice of the law in this country the domestic relations have
largely been looked at askance by the bar. That the subjects are of vast
consequence is obvious. That there is a need of instruction in their legal
elements, and a need to inculcate a social point of view, can be seen from
&he unfortunate diversity in our statute and case law. Toward this end
Professor McCurdy's volume, with its avowed purpose of modernizing the
subjects of domestic relations and its consequent popularizing of them in the
law schools, is a distinct step in advance in its potential influence on the
law of the coming generation. GEOFFREY MAY.
Les Gouvernements de fait devant le juge. By Noel-Henry. Preface by
Prof. J. Basdevant. Paris, Libraire R. Guillon, 1927. pp. xxxii, 260.
This is an interesting study of an increasingly important problem of
constitutional and international law. The de facto Government, the un-
recognized administrator of a particular area, local or national, enters into
factual and legal relations with citizens and aliens, resident in the territory
controlled, and to some extent with foreign governments. The effect that
is to be given to such acts of de facto Governments (a) by the courts of
the parent State or de jure Government, (b) by the courts of third States
which have not recognized the de facto Government, and (c) by inter-
national courts, is the special problem with which the author is concerned.
He has drawn, as sources, upon the decisions of municipal courts in France,
Germany, Italy, England and the United States and upon certain decisions
of international tribunals.
In his approach to the problem from the three distinct points of view
mentioned, the author has thrown light upon it. Briefly, his thesis is that
the term de facto Government is one of constitutional, not international
law. Before (a) domestic judges, who are bound by the views of the
political department, the matter presents a simple constitutional question.
Before (b) judges of third states, the issue turns on the recognition or
refusal thereof by the political department, the courts deducing the neces-
sary legal consequences. The author criticizes some of the recent decisions
of the New York Court of Appeals in dealing with the acts of the $Soviet
Government and challenges the views of certain authors by asserting that
precedents from group (a) are drawn upon for the solution of problems
in group (b) and by characterizing as improper the independent investiga-
tion by the courts of political facts and the drawing of conclusions there-
from. Possibly the peculiar anomaly presented by the relations of the
United States to Soviet Russia, the impossibility of disregarding obvious
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facts and the desire to do justice in particular cases account for some
of the decisions of our courts, even if they depart from scientific theory.
Besides, it is doubtful if the author's postulated thesis is as general or
politic as he assumes. Before (c) the international judge, the author
maintains, the problem is not one of governments de facto, but of the
recognition of insurrectionary governments, and the extent to which
they may validly bind the State. These matters are, he says, to be judged
by international law exclusively; so that he imposes on the international
judge the duty and function of determining whether recognition was
properly granted or withheld, and thence deduces legal consequences. Thus,
he concludes that Judge Taft, as Sole Arbitrator of the claim of Great
Britain against Costa Rica arising out of the acts of the unrecognized
Tinoco government, should have dismissed the British claim because Britain
had failed to perform its "international duty" to recognize the Tinoco
government. (1924) 18 Am. J. OF INTEir. LAW 155. Presumably, he would
also, on the same ground, consider the United States estopped from press-
ing claims against Mexico arising out of acts of the Huerta government.
But the Mixed Claims Commission dicl not so decide and was probably
correct. Hopkins v. Mexico, Opinions of the Commissioners 42, 50 (Mixed
Claims Comm., 1927). The author's view is interesting and not without
merit de lege ferenda, but it can hardly be deemed an existing rule of
international law. Recognition is still a national political act, not yet
subject to criteria set by international law. Incidentally, it may be said
that the work of Spiropoulos, Die de facto.regjicmng im T1:9crr'cht (1920)
has dealt more thoroughly with the international law aspects of the problem.
EDV-Nx BOrcIArm.
Tlhe Social Sciences and Their Intcrrclations. Edited by William F. Ogburn
and Alexander Goldenweiser. Boston, Houghton Mifflin Co., 1927. pp.
viii, 506.
The editors in a rapid survey in the introduction show the "one becoming
many" as points of view develop into science- The efficacy of these points
of view in bringing new hypotheses to light obscures the fact that the
separate techniques are fundamentally different ways of attacking the
same problems. The separation becomes the more pronounced because
each discipline requires a life time to master, and because one inevitably
leans toward what one has worked long and hard to acquire, and what
one has found to be useful. It becomes complete when complicated technical
vocabularies make communication all but impossible. The aim of the pres-
ent volume is to make a new "one" by coordinating the many sciences, so
that each will cast its own particular illumination on every problem.
The essays that make up the body of the book are restatements of the
general aim with regard to specific sciences The importance of combining,
for instance, economic and anthropological methodology in studies of primi-
tive societies; of anthropology and law in studying modern society; of
psychology and political science; sociology and law; history and economics
etc., through the whole series of permutations and combinations of the
various social sciences. The need which the editors point out is empha-
sized by the succeeding papers; the thesis is strengthened but not clarified
by the cumulative evidence presented. Only occasionally, as in Allport's
article on Political Science and Psychology (p. 259) is there any indication
of the development of a new method.
Omniscience being rare, the problems of social science will not be solved
by single persons who are necessarily expert in only one field of learning,
aud who must therefore depend upon hearsay when they stray outside
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of that field. There have already been enough attempts of that sort pretty
well to discredit a more genuine one at discovering interrelation. Lawyers,
in particular, have sinned by hastily acquiring a vocabulary from second-
ary sources and using it indiscriminately in their own fields. They effect
not interrelation, but merely translation, and a free one at that. The
result of the use of an inadequately learned terminology of a lower science
as "explanation" is at best a specious clarification. What, for instance,
is the net gain to either law or psychology of calling an act a willed muscu-
lar contraction or intent subvocal speech? Clearly none, unless the author
is being paid by the word for his article.
The hope of the future lies in joint attack, the method, for example, of
the Massachusetts Crime Survey; in the growth of sociological jurisprud-
ence by studies made by lawyers and sociologists, or an anthropological psy-
chology by combining the efforts of anthropologists and psychologists. How
little of this has been done is apparent from the list of essays in this volume,
and the references appended to each one. No paper in the book (save the
introduction by the editor) and almost no study referred to is the joint
product of two or more individuals with different scientific backgrounds.
In each case omniscience is the aim-in no case is it achieved. The result
is argument, not science-ingenious argument sometimes, but not the pains-
taking labor that each scientist is willing to expend in his own field. Instead
of clarifying a minute point, the attempt is to cover a whole field.
Joint studies are, of course, not the least bit popular; they are not spec-
tacular; they combine different technical vocabularies; they do not cover
whole sciences with a few generous strokes of the brush; they do not have
an immediate practical value. Yet they are of more significance than the
cultivation of a popular attitude of expectancy before there are any re-
sults to offer; and they do not encourage easy cliches. If it is suggested
that this is a popular, not a technical book, the answer is that the time is
not yet ripe. Popularization should succeed, not precede scientific work.
Otherwise it is too likely to set the fashion. Presenting one or two joint
studies in this book would have gone a great way toward discouraging the
idea that here was a simple task, readily accomplished by every histrionic
teacher of the young idea. DONALD SLESINGER.
Handbook of Roman Law. By Max Radin. St. Paul, Minn., West Publish-
ing Co., 1927. pp. xiv, 516.
The writing of a book on Roman Law for the American public is a
matter of extraordinary difficulty, and no two persons will agree as to the
nature of such a book. To bring a handbook of Roman Law within the
form of a Hornbook is a task impossible of successful accomplishment.
Roman Law is too vast and complicated a subject to be handled in such
a manner. Within the brief space of 485 pages, Professor Radin deals not
only with the vast body of Roman Private Law, but he devotes 104 pages
thereof to the History of Roman Law, one chapter to Roman Criminal Law,
and one chapter to the Study of Roman Law. The subject of criminal law
is disposed of in ten pages, and the complicated rules growing out of the
Roman family law in sixteen pages.
Although the book is called a Handbook of Roman Law, it was intended
in fact to be but "a brief and simple introduction" to Roman Law, written
primarily for American lawyers and law students. The author's main
concern, it is apparent throughout, was to produce a book that would hold
the reader's interest. Hence the slight consideration given to the Roman
family law. Hence the lack of all details and the omission of all difficult
and intricate problems. Hence the mere touching upon the high spots of
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Roman Law, with an occasional comparison with Anglo-American Law.
Hence, also, the omission of all notes of an amplifying nature.
In the attainment of the above objective the author has been eminently
successful. He has produced a very readable book, which doubtless will
encourage many to get a bowing acquaintance with Roman Law, who would
have been frightened off by a more pretentious work.
ERNEST G. LORENZEN.
Readings on the History and System of the Common Law. Compiled and
edited by Roscoe Pound and Theodore F. T. Plucknett. Third edition
completely revised. Rochester, Lawyers Co-operative Publishing Co.,
1927. pp. xx, 731.
Teachers of law are familiar with the second edition of these readings,
and will welcome the new edition. The term "completely revised" is used
advisedly. All translations have been carefully re-examined, and Professor
Plucknett's name assures that his newly translated Latin and French
texts may be relied upon with safety.
The edition is also new in much of its material. Chapter I, dealing with
"fundamental conceptions," has been increased from 25 to 42 pages, a sub-
stantial addition, after allowing for the difference in type-page. A similar
increase has taken place in Chapter II on the history of the common law.
Not only the bulk but the value of the volume has been increased. Notes
in fine print add to its usefulness. But a new edition always partakes to
some extent of the old. While the Hohfeld terminology has found recog-
nition on page 475, the references on reformed procedure (p. 411) are not
of the latest, and the reviewer has some feeling that pp. 412-40 on the
elements of procedure could now be put to more effective use.
This volume was originally prepared for college students, and the second
half contains much-elementary material not primarily of value in the law
school But nowhere in the law school does the student now get a satisfac-
tory notion of the law as a system and of its historical background. The
first four chapters of this volume (pp. 1-349) and portions of the book fol-
lowing page 349 may well form the partial basis for a law school course.
Nobody better than these editors could devise a volume as the basis for
such a course, but a volume designed explicitly for the purpose would be
more usable than this, and would do much to encourage a broader attitude
in law schools toward the law as a system. We suffer now from the law
school treatment of the law as a group of independent subjects.
WALTER F. DODD.
Suretyship, Its Origin and History in Outline. By T. Hewitson. Sidney,
Australia, The Law Book Company of Australasia, Ltd., 1927. pp..i,
188.
"The merit, if any, of this attempt will be found not so much in what it
accomplishes, as in what it suggests as awaiting accomplishment, in this,
as in other special fields of Jurisprudence."
This sentence and the title selected accurately suggest the books scope-
and the author's purpose.
Its most striking characteristic is its comprehensiveness. Part I, dealing
with suretyship in legal history "In the East," is divided into three chapters
entitled "In the Near East", "In Greek Law" and "In other Systems."
Part II deals with the history of suretyship "In the West", "Roman Law",
"Mediaeval Law" and "Late Mediaeval Law" being dealt with in separate
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chapters. A third part deals with the history of suretyship in Britain and
Ireland. Seven of the nine chapters comprising this part are devoted to
the early English Law, one to Welch and Irish Law and a final chapter
deals with "The Transition from Plegiatio to Contract in English Law."
"The Part of Equity in the Development of Suretyship" comprises the
fourth and last part. It is dealt with under the Roman Law, "some modern
systems" and finally under the English Law. The history of the surety
is then considered with reference to his relation to the parties, the creditor,
the principal and the co-surety. A final chapter deals with the "Bill of
Exchange as a Contributory Source of Suretyship Law."
Though only an outline, this book is scholarly and distinctly worth while.
H. W. ARANT.
In the December issue of the present volume of the Journal appeared a
review by Di Thomas Baty of Prof. A. N. Sack's book, Les effects des trans-
formations des ttats sur leur dettes publiques et autre obligations finan-
cigres. Prof. Sack, in a letter to the Journal has taken exception to cer-
tain parts of this. His letter together with Dr. Baty's reply thereto follo W.
Dear Sir:
I thank you very much for the copy of your Journal. I have read with
much interest Dr. Baty's able review of my book and I should like to say
that I much appreciate the flattering remarks he has made upon it.
Unhappily the critical part of the review contains statements which
thoroughly misrepresent my ideas. It is of great importance for me in
general that such things should not happen, but I feel obliged to be
especially careful in the present case having regard to the wide sphere and
high qualifications of your readers and to the striking misunderstandings
which some of Dr. Baty's statements unfortunately lead to. You would
therefore oblige me very much by printing in your columns the following
rectification.
On page 274 Dr. Baty says:
"Professor Sack is never tired of repeating that, if a change in its
(population's) governments does not affect the incidence of its obligations,
neither can it be affected by a change in its territory, and that therefore
its obligations continue to attach to the population of the territory when
it has passed under a new sovereignty, and to bolster up this conception
he resorts to the extraordinary expedient of denying that a new government
can be regarded as successor to the sovereignty of the one it dispos'es of,
if it effects to draw its sanction from a different source-God or the People
(p. 66). Such an argument demonstrates the weakness of his position.
The appeal to one occult force or another as the source of sovereignty has
no bearing on the fact of sovereignty and this desperate reasoning by itself
sufficient to show the doctrinaire character of his arguments."
In that way an opinion which is quite the opposite of mine is attributed
to me. In the parts of my treatise quoted by Dr. Baty I have clearly shown
(pp. 64-67) that those are the absurd but unavoidable conclusions which
one is obliged to draw from the theory which I reject and which on the
basis of arguments relating to the sovereign nature of the State denies
continuity in State debts.
I have put all these conclusions in French "conditional time," (pp. 66-67:
pourrait, serrait, resulterait, trouverait, aurait, sauraient, etc., etc.) In
order to show that these absurd conclusions should be (p. 66 in fine: I'll
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resulterait de cette theorie . . . ) if the above mentioned erroneous theory
were accepted.
I am glad to agree with Dr. Baty that "this desperate reasoning is by
itself sufficient to show the doctrinaire character" of the theory which I
reject and which is quite the opposite of mine.
Some other remarks of Dr. Baty should also require substantial rectifi-
cations, but as they are of minor importance I feel obliged not to abuse
of your space.
I want only to add that I should be sorry to convey an impression ad-
verse to the whole of Dr. Baty's review, which is a very courteous and able
one.







Misrepresentation or garbling of an author's views is the unforgivable
sin of a reviewer. It is a matter of serious concern to me that I should
be supposed to have misrepresented Prof. Sack's attitude in his recent
most weighty and interesting book.
There are three elements in the problem attacked by the author. There
is the territory governed; there is the governing body of the moment; there
is the State as an organism.
Professor Sack's thesis is that, in principle, the territory remains liable
for the undertakings of the government, under whatever sovereignty it
passes, in opposition to the usual view that it is the State which remains
liable, whatever its increase or diminution of territory. The Professor sup-
ports this thesis by the argument ad absurdu, that, if the usual thesis
is correct, there must be a difference in the results which follow upon a
change of government (the territory remaining constant) according as the
change is more or less radical: i. e. according as it is a change which
involves more or less alteration in the assumed fundamental basis of power.
A change from a "popular" republic to a "popular" King of the French
would, he says, have to be treated differently from a change of a "popular"
government to a government "by divine right." In the latter case "on
pourrait affirmer" that the new power is not the successor of that which
it succeeds. This I naturally took to mean-not, "it might mistakenly be
said," but-it might properly be said that the new power does not exercise
the sovereignty of the old one, but a new one of its own. Professor Sack
now says that he did not mean that; he does not wish to deny the continuity
of the sovereignty-but only to point out that it "might?' be desired. If
that is the meaning, it attenuates the force of his argument to zero. Any-
body "might" deny anything; and I did him the credit of believing that he
intended to produce a serious argument. But it would have been a falla-
cious argument, for all that; because it overlooks the distinction between
the sovereignty of the State and the sovereignty of the governing body
within its borders. Controversies regarding the constitutional basis of the
latter and its continuity or discontinuity (whatever side the learned author
may take in them), have nothing whatever to do with the continuity of
the sovereignty of the state. It is in the exercise of this sovereignty that
the government of the day makes international engagements, and the exer-
cise of any more or less temporary internal sovereignty of its own is a
matter which does not concern foreign nations.
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To put the matter from a. different angle. Professor Sack says that the
current theory absolves the territory which has passed under a different
rule, on the ground that there has been a discontinuity of sovereignty; the
new ruler is there by virtue of his own sovereignty, not that of the makers
of the obligation. But, he says, this cannot be the reason, because there
is also a discontinuity of sovereignty if the basis of the government within
its own territory is seriously altered; or (if I must not say that he denies
the continuity) at any rate there may be a question about it. The answer
is that there is and can be no question about it; if the new authority is
actually in control, the source of-its authority matters nothing.
Soviet Russia may have no continuity with Czarist Russia-but not be-
cause the theory of the State has been changed; only because the territory
controlled by the new authority was never co-extensive with the Czar's
dominions, nor nearly so. It is a different country. Neither the government
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